We propose an identi…ed structural GARCH model to disentangle the dynamics of …nancial market crises. We distinguish between the hypersensitivity of a domestic market in crisis to news from foreign non-crisis markets, and the contagion imported to a tranquil domestic market from foreign crises. The model also enables us to connect unobserved structural shocks with their source markets using variance decompositions and to compare the size and dynamics of impulses during crises periods with tranquil period impulses. To illustrate, we apply the method to data from the 1997-1998 Asian …nancial crisis which consists of a complicated set of interacting crises. We …nd signi…cant hypersensitivity and contagion between these markets but also show that links may strengthen or weaken.
Introduction
An important unanswered question concerning …nancial crises is whether it is possible to separately identify and measure shocks emerging from a particular source market.
As well as disrupting markets in the country where trouble begins, …nancial crises may spread turmoil into foreign markets in a phenomenon often labelled 'contagion'. 1 Here we develop a method for separating these increased crisis-period linkages into two categories.
The …rst category is hypersensitivity to information from elsewhere during a local crisis, in other words, where turmoil at home changes the way a domestic market reacts to news from foreign markets. The second category is changes to the impact of news from a troubled foreign market on (potentially non-crisis) domestic markets -we restrict the label 'contagion'to this second e¤ect. These categories can be separately measured whenever domestic and foreign crises are not totally coincident.
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This distinction is not an unnecessary abstraction since each category supports different crisis management and prevention policies. While the domestic policy makers of a country in crisis are likely to be interested in preventing increasing hypersensitivity, that is, preventing their own troubled market from over-reacting to external news, they have little incentive to prevent their crisis spreading to foreign markets. On the other hand, such a crisis may generate externalities to other countries in the form of contagion so that governments and market participants in non-crisis countries may want to protect their markets from foreign-sourced trouble, if possible. The existence of these externalities is consistent with the agenda for coordinated global reforms in regulation, …nancial infrastructure and instrument design following major incidents.
Here we model contemporaneous linkages between …nancial markets during normal times, as well as changes during crisis periods. In order to capture the well-known clustering of …nancial returns, we base our analysis in a multivariate GARCH model of asset 1 Consistent with recent literature, we here refer to 'pure'contagion in the terminology of Dornbusch et al. (2000) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002) , as distinct from crisis-driven changes in fundamental linkages.
2 Theoretical models of contagion propose mechanisms such as information asymmetry and portfolio rebalancing (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002; Yuan, 2005) , institutional and regulatory linkages, and relationship complexity (Allen and Gale, 2000; Brusco and Catiglionesi, 2007; Pavlova and Rigobon, 2007) . Recent network theory tallies particularly well with the empirical framework developed here, see Allen and Babus, (2008) . market interaction. However we do not simply work with the standard spillovers from a reduced form MGARCH, instead, we model contemporaneous structural interactions between concurrently trading markets using an extension to the work of Caporale et al. (2005) and Rigobon and Sack (2004) on identi…cation via heteroskedasticity. Within the framework we allow di¤erent regimes, corresponding to periods of tranquility and to a series of crises experienced during the sample period. One advantage of our structural GARCH approach is that the model identi…es the underlying independent shocks which are key to sourcing transmissions between asset markets.
We also implement an innovative approach to classifying and interpreting structural shocks by attributing them to a speci…c source market using variance decompositions.
Unlike previous approaches, this method is data-driven and does not rely on arbitrary restrictions such as market hierarchies, orthogonalizations or chronology. Once we have matched structural shocks to their market of origin, it becomes possible to track the size and duration of innovations from any particular source and compare their relative importance under di¤erent regimes (that is in the di¤erent crises or tranquil periods). The rich interactions captured in our model contribute to the developing empirical literature on cross-country and cross-asset-market crisis models. In addition, our technique can be applied to other crises where the source of trouble is unclear, enabling observers to distinguish the real underlying drivers of contagion from simple crisis chronology.
Data from the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 o¤ers a tangle of interrelated information ‡ows between regional markets; we can untangle key elements of crisis transmission using our structural model. Taking the perspective of an international investor, we model daily U.S. dollar returns to major equity market indices during the crises in Asia over the period [1997] [1998] . The sample consists of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, each of which had their own crises and potentially also received transmissions from other crisis countries. The results show statistically signi…cant contagion between a number of countries and some evidence for hypersensitivity. Not all signi…cant crisis changes were associated with increases in market integration; several linkages weakened. Our …ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that in many cases the crisis country had weak incentives to slow down the spread of turbulence to neighbors, while nearby markets under the threat of contagion had more cause to take a proactive role in curbing the crisis of an a¤ected neighbor, or once a crisis has developed, to look for protection either via domestic regulation or international policy coordination.
Further analysis using innovation accounting for an equally-weighted portfolio of equity indices shows the rise in importance of Korean and Hong Kong-sourced shocks as transmitters of contagion in the region, a reaction made more marked by the Hong Kong market's hypersensitivity to news from Indonesia during October 1997. The cross market e¤ects revealed by impulse responses on covariances between assets show how the covariances between non crisis countries can be a¤ected by the events unfolding elsewhere.
The paper begins with a brief review of the modelling of contagion, the di¢ culties this presents for policy makers in using the results, and how this motivates the current paper. In Section 3 we set out the modelling strategy and Section 4 explains the dynamic analysis. The Asian data and estimation results are reported in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes.
Motivation
Crisis-driven changes in the transmission of asset market shocks are often labelled contagion. Theoretical models of contagion have emphasized the role of information ‡ow, (Akhigbe and Madura, 2001), portfolio rebalancing (Kodres and Pritzker, 2002) and institutional linkages (Allen and Gale, 2000) . Most recently, the linkages created through networks in international banking have come to attention as a means of transmitting crises through …nancial institutions; for an overview see Allen and Babus (2008) .
Empirical contagion models aim to measure these changes in the relationships between asset markets. For example Rigobon (2001) emphasizes increased correlations. This may come through increased strength of existing linkages, as in Eglo¤ et al. (2007) who investigate microstructural channels when looking at credit risk transmission, or via changes in the parameters connecting assets, such as Yang et al. (2009) . Alternatively, contagion may be viewed as the opening of new channels of transmission during crisis, see Dungey and Martin (2007) . Other authors emphasize nonlinearities and use threshold models to separate tranquil and crisis periods; such as Bae et al. (2003) and Billio and Pelizzon (2005) Knowing how to respond to a crisis depends on more than simply knowing that contagion exists, or measuring the size of these e¤ects, although these are undoubtedly important aspects. To formulate an appropriate crisis response it is also critical to be able to trace the source of the crisis. For example, the Bank of England, viewing constraints on the economy as emerging from the banking sector, provided …nancial support to improve banks' balance sheets in order to tackle reduced credit to businesses and households.
Thus far, the empirical literature on …nancial contagion has not addressed this issue, but simply identi…es changes in the relationship between markets.
Here we provide a method for identifying both the existence of contagion between markets, and to identify the direction of transmission. We distinguish between contagion, which is the impact of a crisis in one market on another non-crisis market, and hypersensitivity, which is the increased sensitivity a market in crisis experiences to externally generated shocks. The distinction between contagion and hypersensitivity is important for policy making. If a market is in crisis, it is most likely that domestic policy makers are more concerned about hypersensitivity than contagion -that is they are concerned about the increased reaction of the domestic economy to foreign shocks during this time,
and less concerned about the e¤ects of their own crisis on others. On the other hand, foreign countries who are not experiencing a crisis are concerned mainly about limiting the spread of the crisis and hence about the e¤ects of contagion. This highlights an important tension in forming international agreements on crisis management -the incentives of the crisis and non-crisis countries are quite di¤erent. In the Asian …nancial crisis of 1997-1998, for example, the actions of Malaysia in limiting capital ‡ows from the end of August 1998 is a good example of a country concerned with limiting hypersensitivity, while the IMF programs of the time can be portrayed as attempts to limit contagion to developed markets. In this paper we look to the empirical separation of these e¤ects.
Modelling strategy
Consider a vector of k …ltered asset returns Y t ;which are all potentially contemporaneously interlinked in tranquil periods, so that the system can be described as
where B is a k k matrix of coe¢ cients representing these non-crisis linkages, b ij , normalized on the diagonal elements of B: The …lter removes non-zero means, auto-correlation, spillovers, and contemporaneous common factors. A typical choice of …lter is a VAR(1) in returns with the US short term interest rate as an exogenous variable representing global …nancial conditions; see Forbes and Rigobon (2002) . The k 1 vector u t represents the idiosyncratic shocks in the system,
where g t is a k k diagonal matrix. (Scaled structural innovations u t are uncorrelated.)
The underlying shocks themselves, given by k 1 vector " t ; are distributed i:i:d: standard normal: Appendix A gives a detailed k = 2 dimensional example of the model and dynamics.
Here, we capture hypersensitivity and contagion as a change in the strength of linkages between asset returns during a crisis consistent with the approach of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) , Favero and Giavazzi (2002) , and Pesaran and Pick (2007) amongst others. 4 (These additional parameters can also detect nonlinearities in the mean equations associated with the crises.) We explicitly model both the ability of countries to transmit contagion abroad and any super-sensitivity to foreign shocks during periods of domestic crisis. In the past, these two e¤ects have not been separately distinguished nor empirically quanti…ed, both being captured in a single measure. We model tranquil and crisis periods as follows: (4) 
Since both G t 1 and u t 1 are unobservable, we specify the system as a reduced form,
The joint conditional distribution of the vector of …ltered returns is
and we work with this reduced form covariance matrix, H t ; which can be estimated as a multivariate GARCH process in the …ltered returns vector
Identi…cation of the structural parameters in B from the estimated value of H t depends on establishing the link between the structural parameters and the reduced form.
The lower diagonal elements of the reduced form covariance matrix H t can be expressed
where C 0 is a k(k + 1)=2 1 vector of constant coe¢ cients, C 1 is a k(k + 1)=2 k matrix of ARCH coe¢ cients , C 2 is a k(k + 1)=2 k matrix of GARCH coe¢ cients and h t is a k 1 vector of the diagonal elements of H t .
To establish the relationship between the coe¢ cients of H t and the structural parameters we begin with the vector of ARCH terms. Relying on the independence of structural shocks, we set cross products to zero and write
Next we can make a similar transformation of the GARCH terms:
where vecd is the vector of the diagonal elements of the matrix.
If we again rewrite H t = AG t A 0 in vech ( ) form and de…ne the required transformation of the A matrix as A v , a k(k + 1)=2 k matrix of products of the elements of A;
then the reduced form covariance matrix is comprised of structural shocks and structural parameters,
Finally by substituting equation (13) and equation (14) we can link the C matrices of the reduced-form MGARCH and the structural parameters,
Estimation and identi…cation of structural form parameters therefore depends on the estimation of the reduced form covariance matrix expressed in terms of structural parameters. The coe¢ cients from the reduced form in equation (12) 
parameters in the C 0 matrix, k 2 (k + 1)=2 parameters in each of the C 1 and C 2 matrices for a total of (2k + 1)(k + 1)k=2. The structural model contains 3k(k 1) parameters in the B matrix and 3k GARCH parameters for a total of 3k 2 : (In the four-country example estimated below there are 48 structural parameters and 90 reduced form parameters, unlike a conventional identi…cation problem where the number of structural parameters typically exceeds the number of reduced form moment conditions.)
The MGARCH structure of the model provides us with additional scores (…rst order conditions) that overcome problems of identi…cation and endogeneity. Overcoming the endogeneity problem of this simultaneous model is possible due to the fact that we do not directly estimate the contemporaneous structural model but indirectly estimate struc-tural parameters as part of the time-varying reduced form covariance matrix. There is no endogeneity problem in the estimation of the reduced form covariance matrix. Structural parameters are non-linear transformations of the reduced form parameters in this model, and although an analytical proof of identi…cation is di¢ cult, we have evidence for local numerical identi…cation since we consistently achieve convergence in the maximization of the structural likelihood function from a range of starting values. 6 Numerical identi…cation of the structural parameters is helped by low correlation between the …ltered returns series. We also con…rm the numerical identi…cation and optimization procedure by estimating the model from simulated data.
Dynamics
Innovation accounting within the SGARCH model gives a mapping of the dynamics of transmissions between markets. We introduce a new approach to connecting each structural shock to a source market without resorting to standard identifying restrictions such as Choleski decomposition or long-run variance assumptions. Our method relies on an interpretation of variance decomposition: we treat the shocks which contribute the largest part of each domestic-market forecast error variance during the tranquil period as emanating from that market. This interpretation is possible because we estimate the entire (normalized) structural model and can thus work with the structural innovations directly, rather than their reduced form counterparts. Consequently we do not need to apply arbitrary restrictions to the structural model to trace turbulence during crises back to a speci…c source.
We make tranquil period dynamics the benchmark then examine the dynamics of both contagion and hypersensitivity e¤ects during periods of crisis. We take the position of an international investor holding an equally weighted USD portfolio of each of the market indices in the model, and track the impact of structural impulses on the volatility of this naive portfolio. While this is a convenient application of the processes and e¤ects, the potential for exploring contagion dynamics in this model are much wider than this simple portfolio example. The model can be used to track individual transmission paths for shocks from all domestic and foreign sources under each of the four crises in the sample, separating hypersensitivity and contagion e¤ects.
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The 1 step ahead conditional forecast error variance for Y t is the …tted value of the reduced form conditional covariance matrix:
treating all estimated parameter values as known with certainty.
The conditionally heteroskedastic properties of the model mean that forecast errors vary with realized volatility at time t, and consequently each forecast error depends on the speci…c history of volatility at time t and more generally on the forecast horizon (Gallant et al. 1993 and Engle and Ng 1993) . Since this process generates almost as many forecast errors at the 1-step horizon as there are observations in the sample, we need a way of summarizing the information without losing the value of conditioning. Here we compute the forecast errors for both tranquil and crisis periods for each time t, and stack them by size, creating an empirical distribution of conditional forecast error variances, e¤ectively based on a series of random draws from the structural error distributions. We then select empirical quantiles from the tranquil and crisis period distributions and compare the forecast error variances and decompositions.
The forecast error variance is a non-linear function of structural parameters and structural shocks, however the identi…cation of structural parameters during estimation means that it is possible to numerically identify the structural errors via the relationship
The percentage of the forecast error variance at time t, V D i;jjt ; for market return y i that is due to each structural shock " j is computed as
where g j;t+1jt is the jth column of the 1 period ahead forecast standard deviation matrix g t+1jt : Each of the structural shocks " j is linked to the ith market if
Further, in the event that an investor holds an equally-weighted portfolio across the k markets, the forecast error variance decomposition for the portfolio indicates the shift in portfolio risk associated with exposure to a particular market during a crisis. The proportion of portfolio volatility associated with each structural shock component can be computed as
where w is a k 1 vector of portfolio weights, in our example, 1=k. Using (20) we can compare the mean contribution of each shock to portfolio variance during the tranquil and crisis periods.
Conditional impulse responses for the variance of the individual returns can be computed using the approach of Lin (1997) . For the equally-weighted portfolio the response is the expectation at time t of the partial derivative of w 0 H t+n w with respect to "
given by
The conditional impulse response of individual components (ij) of the portfolio covariance matrix is computed as
Using the same method as for the variance decompositions, we compute an impulse response conditioning on each time t volatility history, stack each time path into an empirical distribution and draw out speci…c quantiles for comparison.
The Asian crisis
During 1997-1998 there were multiple crises in a number of countries in Asia across several di¤erent classes of assets. The debate over the causes of, and links between, these crises remains unresolved.
The discursive literature at the time of the Asian crisis viewed pressure in the Hong Kong equity market around October 1997 as leading to pressure on equity markets in other countries, and particularly in precipitating crisis in Korean markets. Four of the major countries involved in the turmoil during 1997-1998 were Thailand, Indonesia, Korea and Hong Kong. However empirical evidence on contagion during this period is mixed.
On one hand, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) …nd little evidence for contagion in these equity markets using bivariate correlation tests, and Bekiros and Georgoutsos (2008b) reach a similar conclusion using an extreme value approach. On the other hand, each of Baig and Goldfajn (1999), Caporale et al. (2003) and Baur and Schulze (2005) However the dynamic properties of the SGARCH model set out above allow us to go further than testing for contagion e¤ects. We can also identify the main sources of turbulence for each country's crisis and gauge their relative importance to a diversi…ed investor.
We construct returns as the residuals from a VAR(1) on the log changes in the daily US dollar-valued equity market indices for each country, including also the contemporaneous 3-month US Treasury Bill rate as a proxy for an exogenous common shock, following Forbes and Rigobon (2002) . 9 The full sample runs from 2 January 1992 to 9 January 2007. Figure 1 shows the time series of returns.
The model proposed in Section 3 requires an exogenous identi…cation of the indicator variables, D i for i = 1; :::; k; where k is the total number of equity indices involved so we collate crisis dates for each individual country from existing sources. We set the Hong Kong crisis period as 27 October 1997 to 17 November 1997 (Billio and Pelizzon, 2003; Rigobon, 2003) and the Indonesian crisis period as 1 January 1998 to 27 February 1998 encompassing the period of high volatility in returns associated with political uncertainty and IMF negotiations. The Korean crisis occurs in the lead up to successful renegotiation of its debt moratorium with the IMF on 24th December 1997. Clearly (Panel C in Figure   1 ) the volatility in this market began in late November; we designate the Korean crisis period from 25 November 1997 to 31 December 1997. The Thai crisis in equity markets dates from 10 June 1997 to 29 August 1997 (Billio and Pelizzon, 2003; Rigobon, 2003) .
The crisis periods are shown as the narrow shaded areas in each of the panels of Figure   1 . Table 1 gives data sources and some descriptive statistics for the returns series. The …rst panel is for the entire sample, showing that …ltering does not remove the nonnormality in the data and motivating the use of a structural GARCH model for the …ltered residuals to captured volatility clustering and fat tails. The following four panels
give the crisis periods chronologically, con…rming that, in general, the volatility of returns rises when a market is in crisis.
Our modelling strategy depends on the preservation of higher order dynamics in the VAR residuals, so we tested the returns series for dependence and nonlinearity before and after VAR …ltering. Following Kyrtsou and Serletis (2006) and Bekiros and Georgoutsos (2008a) , we applied the BDS test (Brock et al. 1996) for time-based dependence (independent and identically distributed observations), the Tsay (1986) Table 2 reports signi…cance levels (p-values) for the Tsay, Engle and Hinich tests and Table 3 shows results for the BDS (Brock et al. 1996) .
Estimation results
Tables 4 to 6 gives the results of applying the model of Section 3 to the Asian dataset.
We estimate using quasi-maximum likelihood techniques (QML) via numerical methods in
Ox. 10 We also …tted a multivariate Mackey-Glass model (Kyrtsou and Labys 2006) as an alternative to the VAR(1) but found no substantial di¤erence to the …ltered residuals and so selected the simpler VAR(1) model. Results for the Mackey-Glass …lter are available from the authors on request.
11 The large outlier in March 1996 in the Hong Kong series shows the signi…cant falls in this market and through the region due to concerns over China. A number of events appear to be linked with the outliers for the Indonesian returns, including the opening of the market to full foreign ownership in October 1993, general regional volatility in April 1998, the Bali bombings in October 2002 and political uncertainty combined with major earthquakes in May 2006. The September 11 attacks show up in the outlier in the Korean series and a panic over currency regulations in December 2006 creates an outlier in the Thai series. Model estimation is robust to the removal of these large outliers. We do not report results separately here but they are available from the authors on request. Table 4 Contagion occurs when a local market is a¤ected by crisis in other countries. Table 6 shows the strength of these e¤ects. In this table contagion Table 7 provides the parameter estimates for the GARCH behavior of the underlying shocks. In each of the cases there is a small positive and signi…cant constant and significant ARCH and GARCH e¤ects. The combined ARCH and GARCH parameters sum close to one in each case.
A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that all hypersensitivity and contagion dummies are zero yields a test statistic of 78:24 2 24 which has a p-value close to zero.
In summary we …nd evidence for shifts in the relationships between the equity markets of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand during the crisis period, but these e¤ects are not uniform in direction or signi…cance across countries and crises. In terms of strengthening e¤ects, the Hong Kong crisis had a large impact on regional markets, generating signi…cant contagion in Korea but creating a weakening link with Thailand, where correlation fell (Table 6 ). During the Hong Kong crisis in October 1997, the Hong Kong market also became less sensitive to news from Korea but more sensitive to news from Indonesia (Table 5) . Combining the results reported in Tables 5 and 6 , it is apparent that the Korean crisis later that year transmitted additional turbulence to Indonesia, but at the same time returns from Indonesia became signi…cantly less in ‡uential for the Korean market, possibly suggesting that the domestic turmoil both created trouble for the neighboring market and drowned out feedback from outside. We observe this same e¤ect in relation to Hong Kong and Korea. During the Hong Kong crisis Korea receives signi…cant positive contagion (0:665) but Korean returns are dampened into Hong Kong
( 1:981 in Table 5 ). By way of contrast, the signs on the contagion and hypersensitivity parameters connecting Hong Kong and Indonesia indicate an ampli…cation in both directions: the Hong Kong crisis had signi…cant positive contagion e¤ects on Indonesia (0:103 in Table 6 ) but returns in Indonesia also had a signi…cant positive hypersensitivity e¤ect on Hong Kong during the Hong Kong crisis (0:814 in Table 5 ). The linkages between markets clearly take a number of forms and their interaction displays a complexity previously not disentangled.
Variance decomposition
The …rst panel of Table 8 gives the tranquil period decomposition at one step ahead, with 5th and 95th quantile measures. 12 We use these results to allocate the shocks to their source market. In each case, we label the shock that makes the greatest contribution to volatility in each of the tranquil-period decompositions as the own-country shock. 13 The columns in the table refer to the volatility in each asset (or portfolio), and the rows to the contributing sources of shock. Own-country shocks contribute at least 80% of forecast error variance in each case. The maximum impact from another country at the mean is 17% (the link from Korean shocks to the Hong Kong market). The …nal column in Table   8 gives the variance decompositions for the equally weighted portfolio which also account for covariance between the returns. In the tranquil period, Korean and Indonesian shocks are dominant, at 39% and 31% of the total whereas Hong Kong and Thailand contribute around 15% each.
The second panel of Table 8 shows the variance decompositions relating to links due to hypersensitivity during crisis periods. 14 There are substantial changes from the tranquil period. The contribution of domestic shocks is diminished and the impact of Indonesia increases commensurately. For Hong Kong, Indonesian shocks dominate the local e¤ect, contributing half the forecast error variance. For the equally-weighted portfolio, results
show an increased contribution of 30 percentage points from Indonesia (60%) and about 5 percentage points more from Hong Kong. The contribution from Korea is reduced, most likely due to the changing link between Indonesia and Korea.
During an external crisis, contagion links also create dramatic changes. The third panel of Table 8 shows that the contribution of domestic market shocks to the one-stepahead variance decomposition is reduced under foreign crises compared with the tranquil period for three of the four markets. Change is most dramatic for Indonesia where the contribution from domestic shocks drops by 57 percentage points to a mean contribution 12 The variance decomposition is constructed for all t possible conditionings in the sample. A histogram of these outcomes gives the mean and quantiles reported in Table 8 . 13 The results at 5 steps ahead con…rm our classi…cation. 14 All insigni…cant parameters are set to zero when variance decompositions and impulse response functions are computed. of 42%; contagion from Korea (46%) and Hong Kong (12%) account for this. The contribution of the domestic shock for Hong Kong falls by about 10 percentage points to 71% in favour of an increase in Korean contribution to 26%. The contribution of domestic shocks for Korea decreases by about 17 percentage points, and the in ‡uence of Hong Kong rises from less than 1% to 15%. There is no real change in the Thai decomposition.
Hence, Hong Kong and Korean shocks are clearly important in all countries apart from Thailand. This is also evident in the portfolio results, where the contribution of Hong Kong increases by 7 percentage points to 22% and the Korean contribution increases to 57% due to contagion e¤ects. However, there are falls in the percentage contributions of Indonesia and Thailand to portfolio variance. A structural shock associated with Hong Kong (Panel A) in the tranquil period is the smallest of those investigated here, and takes about two months to dissipate half the initial impact. When we account for contagion, however, the e¤ect of a one standard deviation shock is to raise variance by a factor of …ve over the tranquil period, with increases persisting above the initial tranquil period impact for well over three months.
Impulse response functions
Patterns for impulses to structural shocks from Indonesia (Panel B) are remarkably di¤erent. The initial impact of a one standard deviation shock in the tranquil period is much larger and the distribution of responses is also more dispersed. By contrast, contagion e¤ects are small in this case, so that unlike Hong Kong, impulse responses for shocks from Indonesia in tranquil and contagion periods are alike though the dispersion is greater during the contagion period.
The impact of Korean shocks (Panel C) in the tranquil period is greater than for Hong
Kong, but not so large as for the Indonesian case already discussed. During the tranquil period there are statistically signi…cant linkages with all the other countries in the sample, as shown in Table 4 . The contagion e¤ects are substantial, with the size of the initial shock in the external crisis scenario being …ve-fold the tranquil period shock. Half of this impact has dissipated by 45 days after the shock, but some e¤ect is still present nearly a year after the initial shock. As a result of the lack of linkages from Thailand to other markets, the impulse responses to shocks originating from Thailand (Panel D) are small and do not change between the tranquil and contagion periods.
Overall, the largest contributors to volatility are the Hong Kong and Korean crises.
Shocks from these events increase portfolio variance by between around …ve times and persist for a number of months.
Another way to view contagion is via impulse responses on speci…c covariances. Impulse responses of the equally-weighted portfolio variance average over the whole covariance matrix and can inform diversi…ed investors, whereas responses of individual covariances detail bivariate market links rather than averaging across them, measuring contagion directly. This technique can also give a breakdown of the way interrelationships changes during a crisis. The impulses of the covariances reveal some of the complexity of the linkages which occur during crises. Assessing the e¤ects of shocks originating in one country is complicated by both the crisis market transmissions to other markets via contagion and the potential for changes in the reaction of the crisis market to information from other markets via hypersensitivity. However, there are also discernible secondary level e¤ects so that non crisis countries experience increased covariances with each other even though the e¤ects are not a direct impact of the news from the crisis country. These e¤ects are realizations of the interrelatedness of the system.
Conclusion
We develop a model which contributes a re…nement to the taxonomy of crises: we distinguish between hypersensitivity and contagion. A market which is in crisis may transmit that crisis towards other markets, denoted 'contagion', and it may simultaneously become more or less sensitive to the e¤ects of shocks from non-crisis markets, denoted 'hypersensitivity'. This distinction has some importance in policy discussions.
A country experiencing a crisis is likely to be concerned primarily with preventing the impact of hypersensitivity while countries which are not themselves in crisis are more concerned to prevent the spread of the crisis via contagion e¤ects. Policy design for crisis prevention and management need to be incentive compatible with the actively operating links. This suggests that authorities require a substantial degree of discretion to actively manage crises, as their characteristics vary greatly in terms of the directions and strength of changes in linkages from tranquil to crisis periods.
In particular, our results suggest that during the Asian crisis, the crisis countries themselves had at best weak incentives to slow the spread of turbulence, while the nearby markets had reason to look for protection either via domestic regulation or through international policy coordination.
The modelling framework separates hypersensitivity and contagion based on a multivariate GARCH framework with regimes and exogenously de…ned crisis periods. An advantage is that structural parameters can be identi…ed from the reduced form. Unlike past work, which has relied on arbitrary restrictions to classify the sources of unobservable structural shocks, we use variance decompositions to label the structural shocks and connect them to source markets. This approach enables an economic interpretation of risk transmission in tranquil and crisis periods.
Applying this model to four Asian equity markets during the East Asian crisis period of 1997-1998, we observe statistically signi…cant contagion links and hypersensitivity. Importantly, these changes are not always positive. The Thai market, for example becomes more detached from shocks from near neighbors during their crises. Hong Kong transmitted its crisis via contagion e¤ects to both Korea and Thailand, while at the same time becoming more sensitive to news from Indonesia and less sensitive to news from Korea.
Similarly, during the Korean crisis, Korea transmitted its crisis via contagion to Indonesia but simultaneously became less sensitive to Indonesian market news. From an investment perspective, decomposing the portfolio volatility of an equally-weighted portfolio of the four equity assets identi…es the redistribution of sources of turbulence away from home market and towards outside. Impulse response analysis shows the increasing dominance of Korean and Hong Kong shocks during the crisis, while variance decompositions con…rm this e¤ect and also highlight heightened sensitivity to Indonesian sourced shocks during crises in other countries. An examination of the cross market linkages revealed the variety of e¤ects operating during the crisis period.
This new framework and application contribute a breakdown of the directional effects of the relationship between asset markets during crisis. The model has a number of similarities with the recent theoretical network literature on linkages between …nancial institutions, where those institutions care about in ‡ow from, and out ‡ow to, counterparties; see Allen and Babus (2008) 
Appendix A. Two-asset illustration
Here we present a two-dimensional illustration of the main features of the model and dynamics.
The tranquil period model for VAR-…ltered returns for asset markets 1 and 2, denoted by y 1t and y 2t ; is:
which can be extended for crisis periods to so that g ii;t " it = u it :
To estimate the simple model structure in (A.1) and (A.2) we need to account for the covariance between y it and u jt and the identi…cation of structural parameters, and we resolve both estimation issues by working with the reduced-form covariance matrix.
For two assets, the reduced form covariance matrix vechH t = A v vecd (G t ) from equation (12) using the assumption that the structural shocks are independent so that cross products in u 1t and u 2t can be set to zero. From equation (14) h t 1 = The proportion of the forecast error variance for return to domestic market one, y 1;
that is due to structural shock " 1 is Datastream, translated to US dollars before returns are computed. Sample runs from 2 January 1992 to 9 January 2007 but observations where there is a zero return from any series are removed before de-meaning, leaving 3607 days. Returns are …ltered using a VAR(1) in the returns and the contemporaneous daily 3-month US Treasury Bill secondary market mid-rate (FRTBS3M). Table reports p-values for BDS (Brock et al. 1996) tests for pure randomness in returns (log changes in US dollar values of equity price indexes), residuals from VAR(1) …ltering of the returns series including contemporaneous values of the 3 month US T-bill, and the standardized structural residuals from the SGARCH model …tted to the VAR residuals. The parameter " sets the benchmark for comparing distances between consecutive pairs of points in the test sample and the embedding dimension, m, sets the number of pairs in each comparison set. See Brock et al. (1996) for details. Each period of crisis is identi…ed using an indicator variable D i;t which is one during the crisis in home country i and zero otherwise. Contagion (indicated by subscript c) is modelled as the additional impact on asset markets in home country i during a crisis in foreign country j; given by the parameter b s;ij in each equation, operating when D jt = 1: The relevance of each instance of contagion is tested by the signi…cance of the parameters b c;ij . Estimation is by QML over daily …ltered returns to equity market indices, sampling 6 January 1992 to 9 January 2007. P-values are in brackets. Note: Parameter estimates for the conditional covariance matrix of the structural shocks, G t = diag[ + (u t 1 u t 1 )] + G t 1 ;where is a 4 1 vector of constants, is a 4 4 diagonal matrix of ARCH coe¢ cients and is a 4 4 diagonal matrix of GARCH coe¢ cients. Estimation is by QML over daily …ltered returns to equity market indices, sampling 6 January 1992 to 9 January 2007. P-values are in brackets. 
